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ABSTRACT 
 
During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, over one million Tutsis were killed 
by the government of Rwanda and Hutu extremists. In this study, I address two 
questions: (1) did the Church, as an institution, offer a convincing counter-
narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth 
century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? If it 
did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if any, did the Church, as an institution, 
play, in promoting a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, 
over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic 
narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, that fostered 
genocide ideology?  
 
In spring 2018, I conducted six participant interviews about the missiological 
practices of the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. 
Based on these accounts and other archival written resources, I constructed a 
general account of the pre-genocidal identity narrative present in the Church 
prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
 
I conclude that the Church, as an institution, could have done much more to offer 
a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic 
identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-
state of Rwanda. Moreover, the Church, as an institution, did very little to 
promote a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the 
dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the 
post-independent nation-state of Rwanda. This study offers evidence that 
supports previous research that the Church, as an institution, was complicit in 
fostering genocide ideology insofar as it promoted and failed to counter the 
situational narrative of colonial and post-independent Rwandan Christian 
identity.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
[1] APR/FPR (RPA/RPF): Armée Patriotique Rwandais/Front Patriotique 
Rwandais (Rwandan Patriotic Army/Rwandan Patriotic Front) 
 
[2] CNLG: Commision National pour le Lutte contre le Génocide (National 
Commission for the Fight Against Genocide) 
 
[3] CST: Catholic Social Teaching 
 
[4] MDR/MDR-PARMEHUTU: Mouvement de l’Émancipation Hutu/Mouvement 
Démocratique Republicain–Parmehutu (Movement of the Hutu 
Emancipation/Republican Democratic Movement–Parmehutu)  
  
[5] MNRD: Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le 
Développement (National Republican Movement for Democracy and 
Development) 
 
[6] SIT: School for International Training 
 
[7] THE CHURCH: The Roman Catholic Church 
 
[8] UN: The United Nations 
 
  
 
 vii 
 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS 
 
[1] APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION: A method of communication used by the 
Pope, the head of the Church, as an institution, in communicating to the laity and 
clergy so as to encourage the faithful to undertake a certain action or actions. 
An apostolic exhortation does not define Church doctrine or dogma. A post-
synodal apostolic exhortation refers to an apostolic exhortation issued after a 
synod, or assembly, of bishops. 
 
[2] ARMÉE PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS/FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS 
(RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY/RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT): The ruling 
political party in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda led by President Paul 
Kagame since 1994. Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the party was 
known as the APR (RPA), a group in opposition to the government of Juvénal 
Habyarimana and the MDR/MDR-PARMEHUTU based in Uganda. In post-
genocide Rwanda, the party is known as the FPR (RPF). 
 
[3] BANYARWANDA: The cultural and linguistic group of people comprised of 
those who speak Kinyarwanda and share in its culture, mainly living in the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda and Burundi with minority populations in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Tanzania. 
 
[4] CHRISTENDOM PHILOSOPHY: According to Antoine Rutayisire, in his 
dissertation, Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional 
Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda (2015), Christendom philosophy 
stresses “a kind of Christianity that comes hand in hand with political power, 
[and is] imposed as a culture rather than embraced as a choice and lifestyle.”1 
 
[5] CHURCH GROWTH SCHOOL OF CALIFORNIA: A model of evangelization 
that focuses on numerical – not social – conversion. 
 
[6] CONSTANTINE MODEL (“TOP-DOWN” PEDAGOGY OF 
EVANGELIZATION): A model for evangelization that stresses the conversion of 
the elite as a means for conversion of the masses. In colonial Rwanda this went 
hand-in-hand with the Hamitic Hypothesis and was translated into the 
conversion of the Tutsi elite. In post-colonial Rwanda, prior to the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi, this was translated into the conversion of the Hutu 
elite. 
 
 viii 
[7] DIVIDE-AND-RULE: According to Mahmood Mamdani, in his book, When 
Victims Become Killers: Colonial, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (2001), 
divide-and-rule in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda subordinated (Bantu) 
Hutus to (Hamite) Tutsis, so as to encourage dissent among the groups and to 
discourage unified opposition to colonial Belgian rule. Mamdani writes: “The 
political project of the [Belgian] regime. . . was to fracture a racialized native 
[Banyarwanda] population into different ethnicized groups.”2 
 
[8] ENLIGHTENMENT (PHILOSOPHY): An eighteenth century European 
philosophical movement that advocated for the supremacy of human reason in all 
spheres of livelihood (e.g., politics, education, etc.). Enlightenment philosophy 
has heavily impacted the contemporary Western worldview. 
 
[9] EUCHARIST: In the Catholic tradition, the Sacrament in which bread and 
wine are transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ Jesus and 
consumed. 
 
[10] EVANGELIZATION: In Christianity, the preaching of the Gospel or the 
Christian tradition so as to encourage conversion among non-Christians. 
 
[11] GÉNOCIDAIRES: The name given to perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Literally translated from the French as: “those who 
commit genocide.” 
 
[12] GENOCIDE: Resolution 96-I (A/RES/96-I) of the United Nations General 
Assembly confirmed that, “genocide is a crime under international law” as “the 
denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, ”and that “member 
states [are] to enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and 
punishment of the crime.”3 In 1948, the United Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (A/RES/260) codified that 
“genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious group as such: (a) killing 
members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; [or] (e) forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.”4  
 
[13] GNOSTICISM: A second-century heretical movement in the Church that 
stressed that matter – the physical universe – was innately evil and that 
salvation comes through gnosis and is accessible only to an educated elite. 
 ix 
 
[14] HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS/THEORY: According to Peter Safari, in his article, 
“Church, State, and the Rwandan Genocide” (2010), the Hamitic 
Hypothesis/Theory involved the racialization of the traditional socio-economic 
identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa into Bantu and Hamitic identities.5 Mamdani 
notes that the pretext for the colonial civilizing mission in Rwanda lay in the 
Hamitic Hypothesis, the notion that every sign of “progress” in Africa was to be 
attributed to “Caucasians who were black in color without being Negroid in 
race” (the Hamites) and who were separate from the Bantu, the “so-called real 
Africans.”6 
 
[15] HUTU REVOLUTION: A 1959 social revolution in the present-day nation-
state of Rwanda based on a La Note sur l'Aspect Social du Problème Racial 
Indigène au Rwanda/Le Manifeste des Bahutu (The Note on the Social Aspect of 
the Indigenous Racial Problem in Rwanda/The Bahutu Manifesto) that advocated 
for and advanced a Hutu majority government and subsequently led to the rise of 
Hutu nationalism. 
 
[16] IDENTITY POLITICS: The formation of strategic political alliances based 
on the tendency for people to either group themselves based on (perceived) 
shared characteristics (e.g., Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) or to align themselves with a 
specific group (e.g., from 1900 to the 1950s, the Church aligned itself with the 
Tutsi elite and, from the 1950s to 1994, the Church aligned itself with the Hutu 
elite). 
 
[17] IMANA: The traditional Kinyarwanda word for God in Banyarwanda 
culture. 
 
[18] INDATWA: The name given to Tutsi elites produced by missionary 
schools. Literally translated from the Kinyarwanda as “the elite.”7 
 
[19] INTERAHAMWE: An extremist Hutu civilian militant group trained and 
equipped by the pre-genocide government of Rwanda’s army to help in the 
execution of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
 
[20] INYENZI: The name given to Tutsis during the 1994 Genocide against the 
Tutsi by government officials, the pro-genocide media, and Hutu extremists. 
Literally translated from the Kinyarwanda as “cockroaches.” 
 
 x 
[21] JUDGMENTAL SAMPLING: A research method in which “the primary 
consideration is [the researcher’s] judgement as to who can provide the best 
information to achieve the objectives of [the] study.”8 
 
[22] LE MOUVEMENT RÉPUBLICAIN NATIONAL POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE ET 
LE DÉVELOPPEMENT (THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT): The ruling political party founded and led 
by Juvénal Habyarimana in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from 1975 
to 1944. It was characterized by Hutu nationalism and often referred to as 
MNRD. 
 
[23] LA NOTE SUR L'ASPECT SOCIAL DU PROBLÈME RACIAL INDIGÈNE AU 
RWANDA/LE MANIFESTE DES BAHUTU (NOTE ON THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF 
THE INDIGENOUS RACIAL PROBLEM IN RWANDA/THE BAHUTU 
MANIFESTO): A 1957 document written by Hutu intellectuals under the 
guidance of members of the Church’s clergy calling for the liberation of Hutus 
from both Tutsis and European colonists. 
 
[24] LE PARTI DU MOUVEMENT DE L’ÉMANCIPATION HUTU/LE 
MOUVEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE REPUBLICAIN – PARMEHUTU (THE 
MOVEMENT OF THE HUTU EMANCIPATION/THE REPUBLICAN 
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT–PARMEHUTU): The ruling political party founded 
and led by Grégoire Kayibanda in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from 
1957 to 1973. It was characterized by Hutu nationalism and often referred to as 
MDR/MDR- PARMEHUTU. 
 
[25] LE PÈRES BLANCS (THE WHITE FATHERS): A Catholic religious order, 
officially known as the Missionaries of Africa, that was largely responsible for 
the evangelization of the African continent. 
 
[26] MIGRATION HYPOTHESIS: The notion that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa came to 
the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from different geographical regions at 
different times in history. This hypothesis was used in conjunction with the 
Hamitic Hypothesis/Theory to justify colonial identity politics. 
 
[27] MISSIOLOGY: In Christianity, the study of missions and their methods of 
catechesis or religious education. In this study, missiology refers to the 
messages promulgated, the attitudes held, and the actions taken by the Church, 
as an institution. 
 
 xi 
[28] NATION-STATE: A form of political organization in which citizens are 
united by a common factor, or factors, such as language, culture, or ethnicity. 
 
[29] QUOTA SAMPLING: A research method in which the main consideration is 
“the researcher’s ease of access to the sample population. . . guided by some 
visible characteristic, such as gender or race, of the study population that is of 
interest to [the researcher]. . . [until] the required number of respondents” is 
reached.9 
 
[30] POLITICS OF EQUILIBRIUM: To address “Hutu grievances and [the] 
desire for emancipation,” in 1959, “with the blessing of Chanoine Ernotte and 
Father Endriatis,” Grégoire Kayibanda established Le Parti du Mouvement de 
l’Émancipation Hutu (The Party of Movement of the Hutu Emancipation) or Le 
Mouvement Démocratique Republicain – Parmehutu (The Republican Democratic 
Movement – Parmehutu), commonly referred to as MDR-PARMEHUTU, with the 
aim of defending a “‘politics of equilibrium,’ through which jobs and positions 
were divided according to the percentage of Hutu (85%) and Tutsi (15%)” in the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda.10 
 
[31] POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGY (NARRATIVE THEOLOGY): A movement in 
theology that stresses the use of a narrative approach. It gives primacy to the 
Biblical narrative, while rejecting both conservative and liberal methods of 
theological inquiry. 
 
[32] SIN OF OMISSION: In the Catholic tradition, a failure to act on what one 
ought to do. 
 
[33] SITUATIONIST PERSPECTIVE: A sociological method that “assess[es] 
how historical, political, and cultural structures insinuate a response, or lack of a 
response, on the part of an individual.”11 
 
[34] SNOWBALL SAMPLING: A research method in which “a few individuals in 
a group or organization are selected and the required information is collected 
from them. They are then asked to identify other people in the group or 
organization, and the people selected by them become a part of the sample.”12 
 
[35] STRATIFIED RANDOM SAMPLING: A research method in which “the 
researcher attempts to stratify the population in such a way that the population 
within a stratum is homogeneous with respect to the characteristic on the basis 
of which it is being stratified.”13 
 
 xii 
[36] SOCIAL IMAGINATION: Charles Wright Mills, in his book, The 
Sociological Imagination, defines the “social imagination” as “the awareness of 
the relationship between personal experience and the wider society.”14 
 
[37] THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI IN RWANDA: Under 
resolution L.31 (A/72/L.31), the United Nations’ General Assembly adopted the 
phrase “the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda” as the official historical 
title for the events of 1994 in Rwanda, replacing the previous verbiage of 
resolution 58/234 (A/RES/58/234) which posited the title as: “the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda.”15 
 
[38] THE GREAT COMMISSION: The name given to Matthew 28:16-20 in 
which Jesus tells his disciples to spread His teaching to all the nations of the 
world. 
 
[39] THE MWAMI: The traditional Kinyarwanda word for king in Banyarwanda 
culture. 
 
[40] THE XAVERI FORMULA: A Catholic youth organization founded in the 
1950s that played a crucial role in the social and cultural education of Hutu 
youth. 
 
[41] TRIBALISM: In his article, “Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan 
Genocide: A Catholic Reassessment of Christian ‘Social Responsibility,’” 
Emmanuel Katongole defines “tribalism” as constructed “political identities” 
rooted in distinct, rigidly separated racialized ethnic groups.16 
 
[42] TWO-TIERED EDUCATION SYSTEM: Under European colonial rule, the 
Church propagated an education system in which Tutsis received a higher 
quality of education, both in content and rigor, than Hutus. In the pre-genocide 
independent nation-state of Rwanda, Church “favoritism” flipped and Hutus 
received a higher quality of education, both in content and rigor, than Tutsis. 
 
[43] UBUHAKE: A Kinyarwanda word used to express patron-client 
relationships prior to and during the colonial period. 
 
[44] UBURETWA: A Kinyarwanda word for forced labor policies prior to and 
during the colonial period. 
 
[45] VICAR APOSTOLIC: In the Catholic tradition, the name given to the head 
of an apostolic vicariate, a juridical region centered on a geographic mission. 
 xiii 
 
[46] ZONE TAMPONE: The French word used to refer to the demilitarized 
zone between the Rwandese Patriotic Army and the pre-genocide government of 
the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Literally, Temporary Zone in English.
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Chapter 1 
 
 
General Introduction and Background to the Study 
 
 
Are you saying that the blood of tribalism is deeper than the waters 
of baptism? 18 
 
Cardinal Roger Etchergaray 
 
 
1.1: General Introduction to the Study 
 
During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, over one million Tutsis were killed 
by the government of Rwanda and Hutu extremists, namely the interahamwe, a 
civilian militant group trained and equipped by the pre-genocide government of 
Rwanda’s army.19 It is estimated that in 1994 as many as 90 percent of the 
Rwandan population was Christian with 62.6 percent identifying as Catholic, 18.8 
percent identifying as Protestant, and 8.4 percent identifying as Seventh Day 
Adventist.20 According to African Rights, “‘more Rwandese died in churches and 
parishes than anywhere else’” during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in 
Rwanda.21 In one of the most heavily Christianized nations in Africa, where was 
the Church during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda?22 In what 
ways, if any, did the Church, as an institution, contribute to or fail to address the 
factors that led to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda? 
 
In 1884, the first German colonist Count Gustav Adolf von Götzen set foot in the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda. By 1896, Germany had seized control and 
had become the dominant colonial power in the present-day nation-states of 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania, with smaller holdings in both Kenya and 
Mozambique (this territory was collectively referred to as German East Africa). 
In his article, “Church, State, and the Rwandan Genocide” (2010), Peter Safari 
notes that the German colonists “interpreted the socio-political structure and 
history of the kingdom [of Rwanda] through a pseudo-scientific ‘hamitic 
theory,’” which posited the traditional socio-economic identities of Hutu and 
Tutsi as racialized ethnic identities.23 According to Mahmood Mamdani’s book, 
When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (2001), the ethnic racialization of traditional Hutu and Tutsi socio-
economic identities was a historical process, produced and undergirded by the 
political institutionalization of colonial rule.24  
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For Mamdani, the Belgian invasion of German East Africa in 1916 and the 
subsequent inception of Belgian colonial rule in Rwanda in 1918 catalyzed the 
process of ethnic racialization in Rwanda. Mamdani states: “It took Belgian rule a 
little over a decade to translate its vision of a civilizational mission in Rwanda 
into an institutional imprint.”25 Here, Mamdani notes that the pretext for the 
colonial civilizing mission in Rwanda lay in the Hamitic Hypothesis, the notion 
that every sign of “progress” in Africa was to be attributed to “Caucasians who 
were black in color without being Negroid in race” (the Hamites) and who were 
separate from the Bantu, the “so-called real Africans.”26 That is, “progress” 
was thought of as a direct result of Hamitic descent from European (Caucasian) 
lineage and, thus, European colonization was justified as the continuation of 
Hamitic “progress,” albeit in a perfected form. 
 
In Rwanda, colonial Belgian rule translated the Hamitic Hypothesis into 
systematic divide-and-rule policy, subordinating (Bantu) Hutus to (Hamite) 
Tutsis, so as to encourage dissent among the groups and to discourage unified 
opposition to colonial Belgian rule. Mamdani writes: “The political project of the 
[Belgian] regime. . . was to fracture a racialized native [Banyarwanda] 
population into different ethnicized groups.”27 Belgian colonial law thus 
enfranchised and empowered (Hamite) Tutsis at the expense of (Bantu) Hutus 
who, consequently, were disenfranchised and disempowered. Here, Mamdani 
notes: “As representation, race was vertical but ethnicity [was] horizontal”; that 
is, Belgian colonial rule ordered society hierarchically: first, between white 
European colonists and Banyarwanda and, second, between Hutus and Tutsis 
who, although ethnically identical (Banyarwanda), were racially unequal.28 
  
Furthermore, Belgian divide-and-rule policy was institutionally implemented 
through Tutsi favoritism in employment and education. According to Andy Story, 
in his article, “Structural Violence and the Struggle for State Power in Rwanda: 
What Arusha Got Wrong” (2012), Tutsis were “systematically favored” and, 
consequently, attained characteristics of a “political elite” and a “superior 
‘race’” under Belgian colonial rule.29 
 
At the time of colonial independence in 1962, Mamdani notes that Rwanda was 
an institutionally and ethnically divided state. He writes: “The political legacy of 
indirect-rule colonialism in Africa was a bifurcated state: civic[ally] and 
ethnic[ally]” entrenched in institutionally racialized ethnic discrimination.30 This 
bifurcated state continued under the post-independent presidencies of Grégoire 
Kayibanda (the First Republic, 1962-1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (the 
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Second Republic, 1973-1994) and resulted in numerous Hutu-Tutsi conflicts, 
culminating in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
 
Here, one can ask the following questions: Did the Church, as an institution, 
offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized 
ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day 
nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? Moreover, what role, if any, did 
the Church, as an institution, play in promoting a “social imagination” that valued 
religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and 
later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, 
that fostered genocide ideology?31 
 
1.2: Background to the Study 
 
In 1946, resolution 96-I (A/RES/96-I) of the United Nations General Assembly 
confirmed that, “genocide is a crime under international law” as “the denial of 
the right of existence of entire human groups,” and that “member states [are] to 
enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and punishment of the 
crime.”32 In 1948, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (A/RES/260) codified that “genocide 
means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious group as such: (a) killing members of 
the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; [or] (e) forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group,” and that “the following acts shall be punishable: (a) 
genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide; [and] (e) complicity in 
genocide.”33 
 
In 1899, under the direction of Monsignor Jean-Joseph Hirth (1854-1931), the 
Roman Catholic Vicar Apostolic of Nyanza between 1894 and 1912, Le Pères 
Blancs (or, the Missionaries of Africa, commonly referred to as the White 
Fathers) entered the present-day nation-state of Rwanda.34 In his article, “The 
Churches and the Genocide in Rwanda” (1997), Gerrard van ‘t Spijiker posits 
that Rwanda “fulfilled the dreams of the White Fathers’ founder Cardinal Charles 
Martial Allemand-Lavigérie (1825-1892): a strong kingdom with one culture and 
one language, thus far never touched by Western cultures.”35 In his dissertation, 
Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the 
Anglican Church of Rwanda (2015), Antoine Rutayisire states that: “Cardinal 
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[Allemand-]Lavigérie founded his missionary strategy on the Constantine model 
that stipulates that when you convert the leadership, they will bring you the 
mass[es].”36 That is, for Allemand-Lavigérie, Christian evangelization meant, 
first, the conversion of the ruling class and, second, the conversion of the 
general population.37 Although this was the case, from 1899-1930, Safari notes 
that evangelization in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda was “slow and 
difficult because the king [Yuhi Musinga] and the aristocracy resisted 
conversion.”38 
 
In 1931, however, under the leadership of Monsignor Léon-Paul Classe (1874-
1945), Vicar Apostolic of Rwanda between 1922 and 1945, Le Péres Blancs 
converted and, in 1943, baptized King Mutara III Rudahigwa.39 King Mutara’s 
conversion and baptism, notes Rutayisire, stemmed from being “trained in the 
first colonial administration school.”40 Like Allemand-Lavigérie, Classe 
embraced a “top-down conversion” pedagogy rooted in missionary education.41 
Tharcisse Gatwa, in his article, “Mission and Belgian Colonial Anthropology in 
Rwanda. Why the Churches Stood Accused in the 1994 Tragedy? What Next?” 
(2000), writes: “For Mgr. Classe, the aim of these schools was to form a social 
elite ‘capable of understanding and implementing change.’”42 
 
Like secular colonial European rule, the Church embraced the “contemporary 
conceptions of race and nationality that viewed the world’s population as divided 
into neatly defined, hierarchically ranked groups with specific innate 
characteristics.”43 Thus, Classe’s “top-down” pedagogy, like Allemand-
Lavigérie’s, was deeply seeded in the myth of the Hamitic Hypothesis: “Both 
missionary schools and catechumenate have been factors used to shape a model 
of society based on Hamite supremacy. . . These schools produced an elite who 
came to be known as indatwa (the elected) who played an influential role in the 
country.”44 For Gatwa, the conversion and baptism of King Mutara can be 
explained insofar as “the old guard chiefs were dismissed, and young literate 
missionary educated men (Batutsi) were appointed.”45 
 
In 1946, King Mutara dedicated the present-day nation-state of Rwanda to 
Christ the King, solidifying the integration of church and state.46 Rutayisire 
notes: “The banishment of the former king [Yuhi Musinga] had sent the signal to 
all the chiefs and notables of land that power had changed hands, and many of 
them in a very opportunistic move decided to toe the line and got baptized.”47 
Christendom philosophy henceforth became heavily ingrained in the politics of 
the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda between 1962 and 1994: one could 
not understand the Church without understanding the state, yet one could not 
understand the state without understanding the Church. 
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In his essay, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: 
Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators” (2004), 
Philip G. Zimbardo argues that situational conditions must be considered in “the 
transformation of good people into perpetrators of evil,” not merely locating evil 
within “individual predispositions.”48 For Zimbardo, a “situationist perspective 
propels external determinants of behavior to the foreground” so as to assess 
how historical, political, and cultural structures insinuate a response, or lack of a 
response, on the part of an individual.49 That is, acts of evil are resultant of both 
situational conditions and individual agency. 
 
In this study, I posit that the Church, as an institution, could have done much 
more to offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of 
racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Moreover, the Church, as an institution, did 
very little to promote a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or 
truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic 
narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda. Thus, I conclude that 
the Church, as an institution, was complicit in fostering genocide ideology 
insofar as it promoted and failed to counter the situational narrative of colonial 
and post-independent Rwandan Christian identity. To quote Jean Ndorimana, 
there was a “crise d’autorité et absence de discernment” (“a crisis of authority 
and an absence of discernment,” my translation) within the Church prior to and 
during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.50 The Church was “malheureux les 
silencieux” (“unfortunately the silent ones,” my translation).51 
 
1.3: Research Problem and Significance 
 
Catholic Social Teaching (CST) stresses the dignity of the human person in the 
context of relationships (i.e., within community). During the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi in Rwanda, this fundamental teaching was violated as Tutsi's 
were dehumanized as inyenzi (cockroaches).52 
 
In this study, I addressed two questions: (1) did the Church, as an institution, 
offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized 
ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day 
nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if any, did the 
Church, as an institution, play, in promoting a “social imagination” that valued 
religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and 
later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, 
that fostered genocide ideology? 
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The questions posed by this study are all significant to future efforts for peace 
and justice in Rwanda, where a large percentage of the population remains 
Catholic and is socially and politically influenced by its teachings. 
 
1.4: Objective of the Study 
 
The objective of this study was to construct a general account of the pre-
genocidal identity narrative present in the Church prior to and during the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
 
Through an assessment of Church missiology (i.e., messages, attitudes, and 
actions taken by the institutional Church) prior to and during the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi, this research was designed to: 
 
[1] understand the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi, 
 
[2] comprehend the impact of the “social imagination” of the Church, as an 
institution, on the situational narrative of Rwandan Catholics prior to and during 
the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, and 
 
[3]  map the ways in which the Church, as an institution, influenced or 
adhered to the political climate prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against 
the Tutsi. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
 
2.1: Scope of the Study 
 
This study addressed two questions: (1) did the Church, as an institution, offer a 
convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic 
identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-
state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if any, did the 
Church, as an institution, play in promoting a “social imagination” that valued 
religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and 
later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, 
that fostered genocide ideology? 
 
The sample size of this study was six participants between the ages of forty and 
sixty, four of whom were male, and two of whom were female. All participants 
identified as Catholic prior to, during, or in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It should be noted, however, that not all 
participants were born in Rwanda nor presently identify as Catholic. Some, for 
example, were born in Uganda or presently identify as Anglican, while others 
identify as non-institutional, or cultural, Catholics. 
 
Data were collected and analyzed between 15 April and 12 May 2018. 
 
2.2: Data Collection Techniques 
 
The research methodology used for this study was mixed sampling based on 
stratified random sampling and non-random sampling techniques, including quota 
sampling, judgmental sampling, and snowball sampling through participant 
interviews on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Stratified random 
sampling focused on the random diversification of sample participants while 
maintaining homogeneity with respect to Catholic identification prior to and 
during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Quota sampling was 
engaged insofar as the sample participants presently live in Kigali (five 
participants) or Butare (one participant), Rwanda. Homogeneity was maintained 
with respect to participant identification as Catholic prior to, during, or in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
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Judgmental sampling was used insofar as initial leads on potential participants 
were garnered through recommendations from staff at the School for 
International Training (SIT) in Rwanda and online. Last, snowball sampling was 
used for post-interview networking with the participant. One or two participants 
can be attributed to the snowball sampling technique. 
 
In addition to participant interviews, scholarly writings and archival research 
were consulted. These documents were reviewed and synthesized prior to 
conducting interviews to help inform the development of an interview protocol 
(see “Appendix A” for a list of sample interview questions).  
 
Participant interviews were conducted using a semi-structured format to limit 
interviewee intimidation and to promote a casual, free-speaking environment. 
Most participant interviews were conducted in English, although one was done 
entirely in Kinyarwanda via the aid of a translator. 
 
Interviewees were assured that the information collected during the interview 
process would remain anonymous so as to limit the risk of disclosing personal 
identifiers. Interviewees had the option to have their interview recorded and the 
rights of the interviewee were respected for those who did not consent to this 
form of data collection. 
 
2.3: Ethical Considerations 
 
The ethical considerations germane to this study focused primarily on 
conducting interviews in a post-genocide context. Such considerations included: 
overcoming the feeling of “genocide business” (e.g., exploitation of the 
interviewee by the interviewer), the objectivity of the interviewee and 
interviewer, and being conscious of the psychological burden of discussing the 
1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Each consideration was addressed 
through my conscious awareness of the role of a scholar: to act not as an 
activist, journalist, nor prosecutor; through the promotion of open dialogue and 
the invitation to hear differing perspectives, not advocating for one line of 
thought or promoting an agenda by “fishing” for answers through biased or 
leading questions; by doing my best to “read-between-the-lines, being able to 
differentiate the subjective personal from the objective facts of the discussion; 
and by providing appropriate emotional responses to personal stories brought up 
by the interviewee.  
 
2.4: Limitations to the Study 
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This exploratory study was primarily limited by the size of sample population 
and time constraints. Six participant interviewees limited the accuracy of this 
study in presenting a general account of the pre-genocidal identity narrative 
present in the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. 
Similarly, time constraints limited the number of participant interviewees that 
could be reached as well as the amount of scholarly writing and archival 
research that could be read. 
 
Language issues and participant hesitancy also limited this research. In terms of 
language, translations were often conducted in a manner in which general 
concepts were relayed rather than direct phrases, although some dialogue was 
directly translated when clarification was requested. Participant hesitancy also 
posed a limitation insofar as possible participants – namely clergy – were 
unwilling to undergo the interview process, either directing me to a higher 
authority to interview (e.g., a bishop) or choosing not to respond to my invitation 
to be interviewed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
They saw themselves in any case as the agents of Christian civilization in an 
Africa sorely in need, as though they knew from their own experience, of every 
form of salvation.53 
 
Basil Davidson 
 
 
3.1: Overview  
 
The involvement of the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against 
the Tutsi in Rwanda has been largely researched from three perspectives: (1) 
the influence of colonial ideology (notably the Hamitic Hypothesis) on Church 
“favoritism” prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda; 
(2) the politicization of the Church via the rise of the nation-state, and the 
subsequent inability of the Church to paradigmatically detach itself from the 
nation-state; and (3) the failure of the Church to speak out or take action against 
genocide ideology prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in 
Rwanda. 
 
This literature review is divided into six sections: (1) narrative theology and the 
“social imagination;” (2) pre-colonialism: culture and religion in Rwanda; (3) the 
Church and the colonial narrative; (4) the 1959 “Hutu Revolution,” independence 
and nationalism; (5) post-colonialism: the Church and the nation-state; and (6) 
the Church accused: silence and complicity. 
 
3.2: Narrative Theology and the “Social Imagination” 
 
In his book, Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda 
(2009), Emmanuel Katongole states that “our identities are never simple 
reflections,” for “all identities are formed over time and shaped by the stories 
we live into.”54 Likewise, the identity of the Church, as an institution, is rooted 
in the stories it lives into – the stories it profligates and proliferates. What 
stories was the Church, in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda, founded on? 
How did these stories directly shape the messages, attitudes, and actions that 
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the Church was promoting, or failed to promote, in Rwanda prior to and during 
the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi? 
 
Postliberal, or narrative, theology stresses the “primacy of scriptural narrative 
for theolog[ical]” understanding.55 In his article, “The Origins of Postliberalism: 
A Third Way in Theology?” (2001), Gary Dorrien states that Hans Wilhelm Frei, 
a twentieth century biblical scholar and theologian, “observed that modern 
conservative and liberal approaches to the Bible both undermine the authority of 
Scripture by locating the meaning of the biblical teaching in some doctrine or 
worldview that is held to be more foundational than Scripture itself. . . [And] 
that during the Enlightenment this sense of Scripture as realistic narrative was 
lost.”56 For Frei, Biblical “‘interpretation was a matter of fitting the biblical story 
into another world with another story rather than incorporating the world into 
the biblical story.’”57 Biblical narrative, in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, thus became “increasingly alien to the Church” and “decipherable 
only to an academic elite” as the dominant analytic (conservative) and 
experiential (liberal) theological paradigms took root.58 Biblical narrative was 
therefore subjected to the reality of the world “with the loss of Scripture as the 
grand formative narrative.”59 
 
In her article, “Storied Identities: Identity Formation and Life Story” (2014), 
Rosemary Rich states: “work in social psychology has led to the emergence of 
another pattern of thought concerning identity: that of ‘storied’ identities.  This 
recognizes the central place of self-narrative in the process of identity 
formation” and suggests that “individuals construct continuous, ever changing 
narratives to produce coherent narratives of self.”60 For Rich, a “storied 
identity” accounts for “the social nature of identity, yet [it] recognizes that an 
individual has an active role in the construction of their own identity.”61 
 
Likewise, Philip G. Zimbardo, in his essay, “A Situationist Perspective on the 
Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into 
Perpetrators” (2004), argues that situational conditions must be considered in 
“the transformation of good people into perpetrators of evil,” not merely locating 
evil within “individual predispositions.”62 For Zimbardo, a “situationist 
perspective propels external determinants of behavior to the foreground” so as 
to assess how historical, political, and cultural structures insinuate a response, 
or lack of a response, on the part of an individual.63 That is, acts of evil are 
resultant of both situational conditions and individual agency. 
 
Both Rich and Zimbardo understand that an individual’s identity is rooted in his 
or her understanding of the social landscape, reflected in the dominant 
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narratives present in his or her personal stories, the social identity promulgated 
by the situational forces he or she was exposed to, and the way(s) in which he 
or she exercised his or her individual agency in various situations.64 
 
In his article, “Violence and Social Imagination: Rethinking Theology and Politics 
in Africa” (2005b), Emmanuel Katongole suggests that: “[The] way forward [in 
African theological thought] will involve a critical look at the history of the 
continent which Christianity has either simply assumed and/or unwittingly 
underwritten, thereby limiting her own resources for naming, let alone 
confronting and providing an alternative to the story of violence and 
dispossession on the continent” (my emphasis).65 Here, Katongole recognizes 
that in order to construct a general account of theological crises on the African 
continent – such as the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda – an identity 
narrative present in the Church prior to and during the crisis must be 
considered, for individual agency is constructed via narrative (both personally 
and socially, or situationally). Thus, the intersection of narrative theology and 
the Church, as an institution, must be at the forefront of any discussion on the 
theological crisis surrounding an individual’s identity. 
 
3.3: Pre-Colonialism: Culture and Religion in Rwanda 
 
Prior to the arrival of German colonists in 1884 and the advent of Christian 
missionaries in 1899, “the Rwandan kingdom was built on a rich ideology 
contained in [the] myths and oral traditions of the ruling royal court.”66 In his 
article, “God in the Public Domain: Life Giver, Protector, or Indifferent Sleeper 
during the Rwandan Tragedies” (2014), Tharcisse Gatwa states: “Myth [was] 
strongly attached to power control.”67 Under Kings Ruganzu II Ndoli (1510-
1543) and Mibambwe III Sentabyo (1741-1746), God’s presence in the public 
domain became associated with the “sacralization,” or “divinization,” of the royal 
court and the Tutsi king, the mwami.68 Gatwa suggests that the “king was 
believed to be born with seeds in his hands, given by God.”69 
 
In addition to the practice of monarchal divinization, Gatwa states that Bernardin 
Muzungu, in his book, Le Dieu de nos Pères (God of Our Fathers) (1974), 
contends that “God’s presence [was] imbued [in] the Rwandan daily socio-
cultural life” in pre-Christian Rwandan society in three ways: (1) “the way of 
revelation,” (2) “the way of philosophical speculation,” and (3) “the existential 
life way.”70  
 
For Gatwa, “The way of revelation” impacted the daily socio-cultural life of 
Rwandans insofar as it speculated about “the origins of human beings. . . and 
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God’s relations with humans.”71 For example, Gatwa notes that “Bahutu, Batutsi, 
and Batwa were mythically regarded as descendants of Gihanga (the mythical 
founding father of Rwanda), the sons of the same father, Kanyarwanda; hence 
they would not harm each other.”72 Here, Gatwa suggests that proverbs such as 
“iyo ucumuye Imana igucira ubugeri (when you sin God shortens your life)” and 
“Imana yerekeza umugome aho intorezo iri (God sends the murder[er] towards 
the trap)” reinforced this notion of non-violence, for “before God everyone 
[was] accountable” in traditional Rwandan society.73  
 
“The way of philosophical speculation” and “the existential life” complimented 
“the way of revelation” insofar as philosophical speculation “succeeded in 
proving that our [human] experience needs a raison d’être beyond any human 
reach” and “the existential life” harnessed the view that the human being 
discovers him or herself “as a special creature, a partner of God and a 
participant to his or her divine nature.”74 
 
Upon the arrival of Le Pères Blancs in 1899, the process of eradicating 
traditional religious conceptions of God and Christianizing the present-day 
nation-state of Rwanda began. Gatwa states: “The dream of Cardinal Lavigerie. . 
. [was to create a] ‘Christian Kingdom in Central Africa.’”75 Because of this, 
“Christian pedagogy made a huge attempt to eradicate all practices of 
Rwanda[n] culture and religion. . . trampling on [the possibility of] a fruitful 
interaction between Christianity and traditional religion.”76 Furthermore, this 
Christian pedagogy was sociologically and religiously detached from traditional 
Rwandan understandings of God and, subsequently, socio-religious practices. 
Gatwa posits that “Christian conversions in Rwanda and Burundi were. . . alien,” 
wiping away “the traditional conceptions of God” through “the deliberate 
evacuation of Imana in the imagina[tion] of Banyarwanda-Barundi” culture.77 
For Gatwa, it was as if “the Whites presented God to Africa as if the latter never 
knew Him before.”78 
 
3.4: The Church and the Colonial Narrative 
 
In his book, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (2001), Mahmood Mamdani argues that “the Rwandan 
genocide needs to be understood as a natives’ genocide. . . a genocide by those 
who saw themselves as sons – and daughters – of the soil, and their mission as 
one of clearing the soil of a threatening alien presence” (author’s emphasis).79 
Mamdani suggests that, during Belgian colonialization (1916-1962), the 
traditional socio-economic identities of Hutu and Tutsi became racially charged; 
that is, Hutu and Tutsi became binary identities circumscribed in legal political 
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institutions through the colonial enforcement of “divide-and-rule” policy – a 
form of systematic political favoritism based on racialized ethnic identities. 
Mamdani writes: “To understand how ‘tribe’ and ‘race’ – like ‘caste’ – got 
animated as political identities, we need to look at how the law breathed political 
life into them,” specifically how the law “enfranchised and empowered as 
citizens the minority it identified as civilized [the Tutsi], and at the same time 
disempowered and disenfranchised the majority it identified as yet-to-be-
civilized [the Hutu]” through employment, education, and access to other 
government services.80 
 
In his article, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda” (2001), Timothy 
Longman states: “If we accept Harold Lasswell’s (1936) classic definition of 
politics as the struggle over ‘who gets what, when, [and] how,’ then churches in 
Rwanda are clearly political institutions, because they play[ed] a major role in 
distributing resources.”81 That is, the Church aided in defining “how the law 
breathed political life into” the colonial identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. For 
Longman, “Christian churches were thus established during the colonial period 
[in Rwanda] not simply as allies of the government but as important players in 
[the] contestation for state power.”82 Here, two facets of the “meta-narrative” 
in which the colonial Church positioned itself must be considered: (1) the 
propagation of the Hamitic Hypothesis and (2) the implementation and the 
implications of “divide-and-rule” policy.83 
 
In 1863, John Hanning Speke, a colonial explorer of the Great Lakes Region of 
East Africa, wrote in his book, Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the 
Nile: “‘It appears impossible to believe, judging from the physical appearance of 
the Wahuma, that they can be of any other race than semin-Shem-Hamitic of 
Ethiopia. . . [descendants of] Christians of the greatest antiquity.”84 Moreover, 
Speke noted that Tutsis were both “carriers” and “conquerors” of a superior 
Hamitic race: Tutsi were “‘Caucasians in black skin.’”85 Similarly, in 1930, 
Charles Gabriel Seligman, the chair of Ethnology at the London School of 
Economics (1913-1934), published his book, Races of Africa, in which he argued 
that “the Hamites, whom he considered to be of Caucasian and Semitic origin, 
were the ‘great civilizing force of Black Africa.’”86 Furthermore, Seligman 
stated: “‘No doubt it is at least in part due to this Caucasian influence that we 
find the curious mixture of primitive and advanced elements in the social 
institution of the interlacustrine communities.’”87 By 1933, Katongole notes that 
the colonial Belgian government had cemented this undergirding thesis of the 
Hamitic Hypothesis through the issuing of identity cards that permanently 
grouped individual Rwandans as either Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.88 
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Like secular European thought, the Church embraced the “contemporary 
conceptions of race and nationality that viewed the world’s population as divided 
into neatly defined, hierarchically ranked groups with specific innate 
characteristics.”89 For example, Tharcisse Gatwa notes that, in 1902, Monsignor 
Léon-Paul-Classe stated that “‘the Batutsi are superb men, with straightforward 
and regular features, with something of the Aryan and Semitic type.’”90 Similarly, 
in 1948,  Gatwa remarks that Father Alexandre Arnoux, in his book, Les Pères 
Blancs aux Sources du Nil (The White Father at the Sources of the Nile) (1953), 
posited that: “‘Obviously, the Batutsi who are related to the Abyssinians, arrived 
a long time ago after the other races. Those among them who descended from 
the nomadic root are recognizable by their Semitic features, height and other 
physical details.’”91 Here, “physical anthropology was called on to justify the 
[colonial] theories of difference” present in Church politics.92 
 
Carney, Gatwa, Longman, Katongole, Mamdani, Rutayisire, Safari, and van ‘t 
Spijiker note that Classe’s – and more generally, the colonial Church’s –
propagation of the Hamitic Hypothesis was deeply seeded in Cardinal Charles 
Martial Allemand-Lavigérie’s “top-down” pedagogy of evangelization.93 Carney 
writes: “Catholic missionaries helped propagate this Hamitic vision of Rwandan 
society during the first decades of the twentieth century” so as to “protect and 
promote the institutional interests of the Catholic Church,” namely “to promote 
‘Western civilization founded on Christianity.’”94 Rutayisire states that “this 
‘cultural imperialism’ is the result of ‘Christendom’ [philosophy], a kind of 
Christianity that comes hand in hand with political power, [and is] imposed as a 
cultural rather than embraced as a choice and lifestyle.”95  
 
According to Classe, the aim of Christendom philosophy was to avoid “‘dark 
days’” if the Church were to “‘take no interest in the apostolate to the ruling 
class, [and] if, by our acts, we give ground for the opinion that the Catholic faith 
is that of the poor.’”96 That is, the catechetical pedagogy of “top-down” 
evangelization – the conversion of a perceived Tutsi political elite –  was a 
direct extension of secular colonial “divide-and-rule” policy rooted in the 
Hamitic Hypothesis and propagated so as to protect the “institutional interests of 
the Catholic Church” in colonial Rwanda.97  
 
Cargas, Carney, Gatwa, Gifford, Longman, Rutayisire, and van ‘t Spijiker contend 
that the Church’s implementation of the Hamitic Hypothesis is best expressed 
via the interwoven relationship between church and state and the 
institutionalization of mission schools.98 Carney writes: “Classe introduced a 
two-tiered educational system in the 1920’s. Students were segregated by 
ethnic group, and [the] Tutsi[s] received a far more rigorous course [of study] 
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than their Hutu colleagues.”99 At Saint Charles Borromeo Major Seminary in 
Nyakibanda, “the final training ground for future Rwandan Catholic priests 
between 1935 and 1962,” this two-tiered education system was apparent.100 
Carney states: “Tutsi students. . . began to dominate seminary admissions” in 
the 1920s.101 Quoting a 1927 excerpt by Classe, Carney contends that: “‘The 
question is whether the ruling elite will be for or against us, whether the 
important places in native society will be in Catholic or non-Catholic hands; 
whether the Church will have through education, and its formation of youth, the 
preponderant influence in Rwanda.’”102 
 
Rutayisire, citing Philip Jenkins’ book, The Next Christendom: The Coming of 
Global Christianity (2011), notes: “‘Most of the first generation of independent 
Africa’s political leadership was Christian, commonly the product of mission 
schools, and these pioneers were often active church members in their own 
right.’”103 Rutayisire contends that mission schools and seminaries in colonial 
and post-colonial Rwanda created “self-serving leadership” within the colonial 
administration and that this resulted in “conversion without real life 
transformation.”104 That is, missionary schools focused on shaping “a model of 
[Rwandan] society based on Hamite supremacy” so as to “preserve their 
position” of the Church – the influence of a “Roman, not an African agenda” – in 
the socio-political atmosphere of colonial Rwanda.105 For Gatwa, “The 
missionaries had reached an agreement with the colonial administration on 
political reforms aiming at removing so-called ‘old guides’ [traditional chiefs] 
from the administration. . . [The] pushing [of] the population to conversion 
[therefore] became both a duty and a motive for [the] political survival” of the 
institutional Church, a policy that relied on and resulted in a bifurcated, 
ethnically racialized, post-colonial nation-state.106 
 
3.5: The 1959 “Hutu Revolution,” Independence, and Nationalism 
 
In his book, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State 
(1992), Basil Davidson argues that the post-independent African nation-state 
has been institutionally subjected to the European nation-state model and has 
thus been enveloped in a “period of indirect subjection to the history of 
Europe.”107 That is, Davidson contends that the formation of the post-
independent African nation-state led to a sustained, though indirect, colonial 
rule through the imposition of European political entities. Davidson states: “This 
is a crisis of institutions. . . An analysis of Africa’s troubles also has to be an 
inquiry into the process – the process, largely of nationalism – that has 
crystallized the division of Africa’s many hundreds of peoples and cultures into a 
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few dozen nation-states, each claiming sovereignty against the other, and all of 
them sorely in trouble.”108 
 
Katongole, in his article, “Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan Genocide: A 
Catholic Reassessment of Christian ‘Social Responsibility’” (2005a), states: 
“Tribal identity and violence associated with tribalism are wired into the 
imaginative landscape of modern nation-state politics. . . The underlying 
problem behind the Rwanda genocide is one of tribalism.”109 Here, Katongole 
defines “tribalism” as constructed “political identities” rooted in distinct, rigidly 
separated racialized ethnic groups.110 How did the “agents of Christian 
civilization” – the Church – influence the post-colonial “social imagination” – the 
political (tribal) identities constructed by colonial society and “reproduced within 
the history of the Rwandan state” –  prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi 
in Rwanda.111 
 
Preceding the 1959 “Hutu Revolution,” Carney notes that Grégoire Kayibanda, 
the president of Rwanda between 1962 and 1973, “associated the church’s 
civilizing mission with the Catholic obligation to protect the common good and 
defend Rwanda’s status as a bulwark of African Christianity. . . ‘baptizing the 
structures and institutions’ of Rwanda’” so as to provide a “basis for the further 
evolution of Rwandan society.”112 In the late 1940’s, “a new post-World War II 
generation of missionaries mainly from Belgium and France” arrived in the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda.113 Such members of the clergy included: 
“Gilles, Dejemeppe, Adrianssens, Ernotte, Pien, and Perraudin.”114 Safari notes 
that these missionaries were “a ‘different bread from the old royalist White 
Fathers’. . . [They] came to Rwanda with a sense of urgency on issues of social 
justice and liberation. . . tend[ing] to identify with the Hutu grievances and 
desire for emancipation.”115 In practice, Carney states that “this meant replacing 
Rwanda’s ancestral custom with Western economic, political, and human rights 
standards, closely associating the building of the Christian kingdom with the 
furthering of democracy and the resolution of Rwanda’s social problems.”116 
 
In 1953, King Mutara III Rudahigwa began the secular movement from pre-
colonial and colonial administration to post-colonial nation-statism through the 
abolition of the “uburetwa (forced labor) and ubuhake (patron-client 
relationships)” in pre-colonial Rwandan society.117 Carney notes that 
“missionaries and indigenous Catholic journalists exhorted Catholics to join and 
shape Rwanda’s evolving ‘march for progress.’”118 Though this was the case, 
Katongole notes: “The basic story embodied within the nation-state in Africa” 
was never questioned – the Church “failed to question these so-called natural 
identities (successively named races, tribes, [and] ethnicities) or to provide an 
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alternative conception or imagination to the tribalism within [post-colonial] 
Rwanda.”119 For example, in 1957, under the guidance of Fathers Dejemeppe and 
Ernotte, the Hutu elite published “La Note sur l'Aspect Social du Problème 
Racial Indigène au Rwanda” (“Note on the Social Aspect of the Indigenous Racial 
Problem in Rwanda”, commonly referred to as “Le Manifeste des Bahutu” (“The 
Bahutu Manifesto”), demanding “the retention of ‘ethnic designation in official 
documents,’” while locating “Rwanda’s tensions in the evils of Belgian Indirect 
Rule.”120 Mamdani states that “the Bahutu Manifesto” “called for a double 
liberation of the Hutu: ‘from both the ‘Hamites’ and ‘Bazungu’ (white) 
colonization” and established the future tone of Hutu power: Hutu nationalism.121  
 
To address “Hutu grievances and [the] desire for emancipation,” in 1959, “with 
the blessing of Chanoine Ernotte and Father Endriatis,” Kayibanda established 
Le Parti du Mouvement de l’Émancipation Hutu (The Party of Movement of the 
Hutu Emancipation) or Le Mouvement Démocratique Republicain – Parmehutu 
(The Republican Democratic Movement – Parmehutu), commonly referred to as 
MDR-PARMEHUTU, with the aim of defending the “‘politics of equilibrium,’ 
through which jobs and positions were divided according to the percentage of 
Hutu (85%) and Tutsi (15%).”122 Later that year, the MDR-PARMEHUTU 
abolished the Tutsi monarchy with the support of the colonial government and 
the Church and, by 1962, the MDR-PARMEHUTU were the sole political party of 
the newly independent nation-state of Rwanda, directly influencing the policy of 
the First Republic (1962-1973).123 
 
3.6: Post-Colonialism: The Church and the Nation-State  
 
At the time of independence in 1962, Mamdani notes that Rwanda was an 
institutionally and ethnically divided state. He writes: “The political legacy of 
indirect-rule colonialism in Africa was a bifurcated state: civic[ally] and 
ethnic[ally]” entrenched in institutional racialized ethnic discrimination.124 
Moreover, this bifurcated state continued under Presidents Grégoire Kayibanda 
(the First Republic, 1962-1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (the Second Republic, 
1973-1994) and resulted in numerous Hutu-Tutsi conflicts, culminating in the 
1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
 
R. Scott Appleby, in his book, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, 
Violence, and Reconciliation (2000) writes: “Secularization shifts the social 
location of religion, influences the structures it assumes and the way people 
perform religious functions, or forces religion to redefine the nature, grounds, 
and scope of its authority. . . Believers transfer religious loyalties to the nation, 
‘the people.’”125 From 1962-1994, the “social location” of the Church shifted 
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from a colonial “civilizational mission” to the newly formed “democratic” nation-
state.126 Thus, the Church and her members remained “externally driven,” 
assuming the nation-state to be “the primary social actor, with power to define, 
manage, and control the social realm.”127 
 
In 1966, the government of Kayibanda and the MDR-PARMEHUTU, nationalized 
all educational institutions in Rwanda under the condition that the state would be 
responsible for the “recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of students” and 
“staff, both lay and religious.”128 Fearing the seizure of parochial schools, a 
secularized educational curriculum, and the “recruitment, promotion, and 
dismissal of students” and “staff, both lay and religious,” the bishops of Rwanda 
issued an unequivocal condemnation of the government of Kayibanda and the 
MDR-PARMEHUTU in 1973, stating: “‘If there are social problems to be 
resolved, and there is no lack of them, let those who are in charge, and not 
individuals and anonymous groups, do so by means of dialogue.’”129 In response 
to this statement, the government of Kayibanda and the MDR-PARMEHUTU 
“sacked the Tutsi Monsignor Matthieu, from his position as Rector of the 
seminary of Nyundo and replaced him with a Hutu soldier, Major Alex 
Kanyarengwe.”130 Safari states: “The government of Kayibanda had moved from 
the shadow of the Catholic Church and was taking an anti-clerical position.”131 
 
With the “support of the Catholic Church,” Juvénal Habyarimana – “a leader 
hand-picked by Catholic Church officials” – launched a coup d’état in 1973 and 
subsequently seized control of the Rwandan nation-state.132 Gatwa states: “The 
Church’s legitimization of the 1973-1994 military regime had two axes. First, 
the hierarchy accepted the invitation to participate individually in the organs of 
the ruling party. . . Second, by rule of law, every single Rwandan born or to be 
born, was forcibly enrolled as a member of the MRND.”133 Accepting the 
government of Habyarimana and Le Mouvement Républicain National pour la 
Démocratie et le Développement (The National Republican Movement for 
Democracy and Development), commonly referred to as the MRND, the Church 
downplayed the continued racialization and systematic discrimination of Tutsis in 
favor of “institutional [political] privilege.”134   
 
In his article, “A Roundabout Revolution: Rethinking Decolonization of Rwanda 
by the Practices of the Catholic Scouting Movement, 1954-1964” (2015), 
Thomas Riot recounts the educational practices propagated by the Church in its 
switch from Tutsi to Hutu political support. Riot states: “At the beginning of the 
1950s, bishops in Rwanda made the decision to strengthen the structures of the 
Catholic movement,” opting for the xaveri formula.135 Riot suggests that this 
movement “played a key role in the social and cultural transformation of the 
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educated [Hutu] youth,” for it was “based on a culturalist and racial fantasy, 
essentializing socio-economic, cultural, and political structures which existed 
just before colonization.”136 In commenting on the rise of the MDR-
PERMEHUTU and MRND, Riot writes: “The leaders [of the MDR-PARMEHUTU 
and MRND]. . . were recruited from the ranks of educated Christian Hutu 
youth.”137 
 
In 1990, the Armée Patriotique Rwandais/Front Patriotique Rwandais (Rwandan 
Patriotic Army/Rwandan Patriotic Front), commonly referred to as the APR/FPR  
(RPA/RPF), invaded the nation-state of Rwanda in response to the violence 
propagated against Tutsis by the government of Habyarimana and Le 
Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement.138 
Longman contends: “Because they [the Church] did not speak out against the 
anti-Tutsi violence [between 1962 and 1993] and the growing propaganda being 
broadcast throughout the country, but on the contrary displayed their own anti-
Tutsi prejudices, the Church leaders’ continued call for support of the regime in 
a time of war was interpreted by the public as an endorsement of the anti-Tutsi 
message. . . Rwandan Christians came to believe that organizing to defend 
against potential Tutsi treachery was consistent with well established Church 
practice.”139 
 
3.7: The Church Accused: Silence and Complicity 
 
In his dissertation, Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional 
Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda (2015), Antoine Rutayisire states that 
the Christianity that was brought to the present-day nation-state of Rwanda did 
not prove in “its capacity to influence and change the social landscape of the 
continent,” but “became a ‘prisoner to [colonial and post-colonial] culture’ 
rather than being a ‘liberator.’”140  Similarly, Basil Davidson remarks: “They [the 
Church] saw themselves in any case as the agents of Christian civilization in an 
Africa sorely in need. . . of every form of salvation.”141 During the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi, did the Church have “any power to save them [the 
Tutsis] from this nightmare?”142 
 
Assessing the Church’s role in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, Longman 
contends, “If churches became implicated in Rwanda’s genocide, it was not 
simply because church leaders hoped to avoid opposing their governmental 
allies but because ethnic conflict was an integral part of Christianity in Rwanda. 
Christians could kill without obvious qualms of conscience. . . because 
Christianity as they had always known it had been a religion defined by 
struggles for power.”143 Furthermore, Longman states: “Because they [the 
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clergy] owed their power at least in part to ethnic politics within the churches, 
church leaders perceived threats to their power partially in ethnic terms,” for 
during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the Church operated “explicitly 
[within a] political paradigm.”144 
 
Katongole notes: “The victims[of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in 
Rwanda] and their killers were quite familiar with each other and had even 
participated regularly in the same Eucharist[ic] celebrations, within the same 
church.”145 Similarly, Cargas writes: “Génocidaires were going to church 
services on the same day they were committing their crimes.”146 Speaking to 
this crisis of identity, Katongole states that Gary Scheer, in his article, “Rwanda: 
Where was the Church?” (1995), posits that Christianity in Rwanda took on a 
“superficial nature” by “self-confessed Christians,” both the laity and the 
clergy.147   
 
Among the clergy, Peterson Tumwebaze, in his article, “Inside Nyakibanda 
Seminary: How the Church is Moving on” (2016), states that Father Wenceslas 
Munyeshyaka was notoriously known for “carrying a gun on his hip and colluding 
with the Hutu militia” during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.148 
Chris McGreal writes, “[For Munyeshyaka], “‘There was no cross. It was just 
the gun.’”149 Furthermore, Tumwebaze notes that “like Munyeshyaka, Father 
Athanase Seromba ordered the bulldozing of his church with 2,000 Tutsi inside 
and had the [remaining] survivors shot.”150 
 
Although this was the case, Munyeshyaka and Tumwebaze were not the majority 
of clergy, but rather the minority: most failed to “speak out” and instead 
remained silent, committing “‘sins of omission’” against their people.151 Van ‘t 
Spijiker states: “The leaders of the Church as a whole. . . saw themselves 
mainly as mediators between the different politicians, rather than seeing 
critically to the churches itself, and taking their own position independent of the 
state. . . Mediators easily become facilitators, and the church leaders who 
become facilitators of politicians easily forget to speak a prophetic message” 
(my emphasis).152 As Jean Ndorimana, in his book, Rwanda: L’Eglise Catholique 
dans le Malaise: Symptomes et Temoignages (Rwanda: The Catholic Church in 
the Malaise: Symptoms and Testimonies) (2001), states: “l’Église doit 
encourager les silencieux. . . On se demandera jusqu’à quand l’Église du Rwanda 
sera complaisant vis-à-vis bienfaiteurs et continuera à sacrifier sa dignité et sa 
liberte” (“The Church must [have] encourage[d] the silence. . . We will wonder 
just how long the Church of Rwanda will be complacent towards benefactors and 
will continue to sacrifice its dignity and freedom,” my translation), acting as 
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“‘prisoner[s] to [colonial and post-colonial] culture’ rather than being 
‘liberator[s].’”153  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Presentation and Analysis of Data 
 
 
4.1: Demographic Overview 
 
This study consisted of six participants between the ages of forty and sixty, 
four male, and two female. All participants self-identified as Catholic prior to, 
during, or in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in 
Rwanda. Not all participants were born in Rwanda nor presently self-identify as 
Catholic. Two participants were born in Uganda, two presently self-identify as 
Anglican, and one participant self-identified as a non-institutional, or cultural, 
Catholic. 
 
Participants’ vocational status in the Church (i.e., marriage, priesthood, religious 
life, or single life) varied. Four out of six participants were married. One 
participant stated that she was single, and the last participant reported that he 
was a Catholic priest, ordained after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in 
Rwanda. Of the married participants, one remarked that he was a former 
Catholic priest, ordained after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, one 
participant said he had gone through seminary education, but abstained from 
ordination, and two participants reported that they were married outside of the 
Church. 
 
Of the five participants that identified as married or single, all disclosed that 
they had at least two biological children, with the minimum number of biological 
children being two and the maximum number of biological children being four. 
 
“Appendix A” questions one to six (hereafter referred to as: A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, 
and A6), lists the interview questions relevant for the attainment of demographic 
information and “Appendix B” lists other demographic and interview information 
collected for each participant. 
 
4.2: Participant Introduction to, Education in, and Description of the Catholic 
Faith prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi 
 
In conducting this study participants were asked the following three questions: 
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[A8] How were you introduced to the Catholic faith? By whom? 
 
[A9] How were you educated in the Catholic faith? By whom? 
 
[A10] Could you describe how the Catholic faith was taught to you? 
 
Six participants stated that they were born into the Catholic faith and educated 
in Catholic primary and secondary schools, or minor and major seminary. Five of 
six participants noted that they were introduced to the Church and influenced by 
either their parents, parish priest(s), parish catechist(s), or primary and 
secondary, or minor and major seminary, teachers, if applicable. And, one 
participant (ID 002) stated: “I don’t think anyone was influential. I was just born 
into the Catholic faith. . . I don’t think these people [his parents, parish priest(s), 
parish catechist(s), and primary and minor seminary teachers] had the 
intentionality to influence my faith.”154 (This information is displayed in 
“Appendix C”). 
 
Of the six participants in this study, three revealed that prayer was an integral 
part of their catechesis (either via communal prayer or learning how to pray). 
One participant noted that attendance at Sunday mass prior to the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi was stressed by his parents. Four participants 
reported that they attended sacramental preparation classes taught by their 
parish catechist(s) prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. And three 
participants stated that behavioral morals such as “do not commit violence,” “do 
not steal,” and “do not disrespect authoritative figures” were stressed by their 
parents, parish priest(s), parish catechist(s), or primary and secondary, or minor 
and major seminary, teachers. Two participants noted that these behavioral 
morals were rooted in the moral code of the Ten Commandments, and one 
suggested that the assimilation to a life like Christ was the key tenet of his 
catechetical education. 
 
Additionally, three participants expressed that catechesis, both by parish 
catechist(s) and primary and secondary, or minor and major seminary, teachers 
focused heavily on the memorization of prayers, Church history, or dogmatic 
practices. Of the six participants, two conveyed that catechesis, both by parish 
catechist(s) and primary and secondary, or minor and major seminary, teachers 
was routine – not critical engagement – based. ID 002 remarked: “You took 
classes on religion, but they didn’t have any such thing as intentionality. You just 
had to pass the exam.”155 Last, one participant (ID 004) reported that: “The 
Church did not directly teach its members to read the Bible” and that this was 
“the weakness of the Catholic teaching in Rwanda.”156 
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4.3: The Church and Missiology 
 
In order to assess the role of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during 
the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, participants were asked a series of five 
questions in order to identify the defining elements of the Church’s missiological 
teaching prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. These questions focused 
on the universal messages that the Church idealized prior to the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi, not their implementation by members of the clergy, the laity, 
or the institutional Church. For example, “What key messages were repeatedly 
emphasized?” and “What did these messages – and the way they were taught –  
teach you about what it meant to be a ‘good’ Catholic?” (Refer to “Appendix A,” 
questions A11, A12, A13, A14, and A15). 
 
All participants stated that the Church taught that the Catholic faith was not just 
an ideology, but a lifestyle meant to be lived. Additionally, each participant noted 
that the Church taught that this lifestyle was grounded in Biblical values. Three 
of six participants stated that the Church taught that the Catholic lifestyle 
stressed prayer on behalf of the society at large, and two noted that the Church 
taught to love without ceasing. One participant (ID 005) commented: “Jesus 
loved His neighbors, [the Church taught that] you should love your neighbors” 
and “Jesus forgave His neighbors, [the Church taught that] you should forgive 
your neighbors.”157 Three participants mentioned that the Church taught that the 
segregation and division of peoples ought to be avoided. ID 001 stated: “When 
you’re [in] a movement, you don’t segregate. . . You’re a member of the human 
race.”158 
 
Furthermore, ID 001 posited that the faith taught to him by the Church had put 
him “in the position to be different from someone who does not fear God. . . 
[but] to ask how [his] action[s] were going to be judged by God?”159 
 
4.4: Clergy and the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi 
 
In order to assess the role of priests and seminary educators prior to and during 
the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, participants that identified as members of 
the clergy, former members of the clergy, or former seminarians were asked the 
following series of questions: 
 
[A16] Could you describe seminary education? What messages did the seminary 
promote prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda? 
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What attitudes were present at the seminary prior to or during the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi? 
 
[A17] What actions did priests or seminary educators take prior to and during 
the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi? 
 
Through an assessment of the role of priests and seminary educators prior to 
and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, these questions were designed 
to address the universal missiological teaching of the Church, focusing on the 
Church’s implementation of these teachings (i.e., messages, attitudes, and 
actions taken by members of the clergy and seminary educators) prior to and 
during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. 
 
Two participants noted that seminary education was knowledge-based with 
little, if any, focus on vocational discernment (i.e., engaging seminarians through 
an assessment of their vocational ‘calling’). One participant acknowledged that 
there was no education outside of analytic philosophy and theology. ID 002 
stated: “You accumulated lots of knowledge about this and that. . . Lots of 
information. . . But really taking you through this [vocational] ‘calling’ to an 
active faith [life] was an area of weakness [in the Church in Rwanda].”160 
Furthermore, ID 002 stated: “[There was] an intentionality to commit to the 
Church, not to a lifestyle. . . It was more a commitment to the Church than to 
Jesus, to God.”161 
 
All three participants revealed that the identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were 
not regularly discussed and, if they were, the subject was taboo. One participant 
posited that “apparently we [seminarians] lived in harmony.”162 Another 
participant noted that the Church reinforced the Migration Hypothesis, the notion 
that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa came to the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from 
different geographical regions at different times in history, and a Politics of 
Equilibrium, through which jobs and positions were divided according to the 
percentage of Hutu (85%) and Tutsi (15%) in the present-day nation-state of 
Rwanda, prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Additionally, one 
participant (ID 006) stated these conversations “were not so much in the public, 
but in the corridors. . . It was a reality, but people never used to talk about it 
[the identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa] openly.”163 For another participant (ID 
002), this displayed an “extreme synchronization of religion to politics.”164 
 
4.5: Participant Interpretations of the Church’s Missiological Practices Prior to 
and During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi 
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Regarding participant’s interpretations of the missiological practices of the 
Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, four questions 
were asked: 
 
[A18] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you 
remember as key ideas or themes that priests preached about at mass? 
 
[A19] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, how would you 
describe the attitudes and actions priests promoted from the pulpit? Could you 
offer an example? 
 
[A21] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you 
remember about the role and influence of the Church? 
 
[A22] During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, do you recall 
priests speaking out against genocide ideology in Rwanda? If so, what did they 
say? 
 
Through an assessment of the missiological practices of the Church prior to and 
during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, these questions were designed to 
address perceptions and experiences of the messages, attitudes, and actions 
taken by the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi. 
 
Four of six participants stated that the messages propagated by the Church prior 
to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi were not applicable to day-
to-day life. Four of six also noted that these messages followed a rigid, 
unchanging paradigm intentioned on allegiance to the Church as an institution 
rather than personal transformation. Likewise, four participants illustrated this 
via perceptions of pre-genocide and genocide homiletics, stating that many 
churchgoers didn’t comprehend the messages they were receiving. Two 
participants posited that this was because homiletics was largely text-oriented, 
failing to offer an explanation of the Biblical narrative. One participant noted that 
Latin was the predominant language of homiletic teaching, and another 
participant (ID 002) stated: “People [The clergy] fell into the trap of text 
engagement, ignoring the question: ‘What does it mean for me?’”165 
 
Two participants noted that clergy members often did not speak out on social 
issues prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi; they stated that 
this largely reflected the attitudes held by the Church, especially its leaders. 
Three participants remarked that faith served politics prior to and during the 
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1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. One participant (006) stated that the Church 
was “part and parcel with the state. . . fighting for the good of the state [instead 
of]. . . talking on behalf of God.”166  
 
One participant (ID 003) remarked that an “enemy” definition was propagated by 
the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, stating that 
this definition arose during the 1992 APR/FPR (RPA/RPF) invasion of the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda and that this definition “matched the news 
about the RPF and. . . identified the enemy as [Tutsis] hiding within the 
country.”167 This participant also noted that the Church sought self-preservation 
prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, stating that priests 
“played between two ideologies,” embracing both Hutu extremism and Tutsi 
persecutionism. Lastly, one participant (ID 004) stated that the Church was 
“weak in testifying for Jesus. . . [in] giving a testimony to Rwandan society.”168 
 
4.6: Participant Identity: The Church and the Nation-State 
 
In order to assess Catholic identity prior to and during the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi, participants were asked to describe the relationship between 
the Church and the pre-genocide government of Rwanda, noting the balance 
between religious and political identity. (Refer to “Appendix A,” question A25). 
 
Three of six participants stated that the ideal relationship between the Church 
and the state should be complementarity. However, prior to and during the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi, these participants noted that Church-state relations 
were dichotomous contradictions of one another with the Church failing to live 
up to its mission and the state wrongfully exercising its power. Four participants 
stated that the Church was either too close to the state or directly involved in 
the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. One participant said the Church was 
politically closed off, failing to challenge the state paradigm. Likewise, two 
participants conveyed that the Church reinforced the state paradigm through 
educational practices and its homiletic attitudes. One participant (ID 004) 
remarked: “[It was] a crisis of identity,” while another (ID 006) stated that the 
Church should have acted as the “moral conscience of the state,” forming the 
“moral conscience of the people.”169 
 
One participant (ID 001) commented: “I have never thought about this [the 
balance between religious and political identity] until now.”170  
 
4.7: The Impact of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi on Participants’ Faith 
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Lastly, participants were asked to describe how the 1994 Genocide against the 
Tutsi impacted their personal faith life. (Refer to “Appendix A,” questions A20, 
A23, A24, A26, and A27). 
 
Two participants stated that the Church’s role in the 1994 Genocide against the 
Tutsi was an element present in their conversion from Catholicism to 
Anglicanism, though they noted that this was not the only motive. One 
participant stated that she was more critical of her trust in the institutional 
Church following the Church’s role in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, while 
another participant conferred that the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi had made 
her faith more fervent. Last, one participant expressed that the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi in Rwanda did not affect his faith, for “faith is not between me 
and the people who are the authorities in the Church, but between me and 
God.”171  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Interpretation of Data 
 
 
Conrad said it best: “All [of] Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz.”172 
 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
In his book, Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda 
(2009), Emmanuel Katongole states that “our identities are never simple 
reflections,” for “all identities are formed over time and shaped by the stories 
we live into.”173 The Church, for Katonogole, should be driven by its mission “to 
be a new community that bears witness to the fact that in Christ there is a new 
identity. . . to embody the hope of a new Creation,” recognizing that “there is 
neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free person, there is not male 
and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”174 The Acts of the Apostles 
states that the Church should devote itself “to the communal life, to the breaking 
of the bread, and to the prayers. . . [to] ha[ving] all things in common. . . 
sell[ing] [its] property and possessions and divid[ing] them among all according 
to each one’s need. . . [to devoting itself] to meeting together in the temple area 
and to breaking bread in their homes. . . with exultation and sincerity of heart, 
praising God and enjoying favor with all the people” (my emphasis).175 
 
Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, Katongole 
notes that the Church was deeply influenced by the “social memory and [the] 
political formation” of colonial rule, and the post-independent nation-state of 
Rwanda, especially “the stories embedded in [the] social and political 
institutions” of colonial rule.176 For Timothy Longman, in his article, “Church 
Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda (2001), the Church “became implicated in 
Rwanda’s genocide” because it was “not simply [an] all[y] of the government 
but [an] important player in [the] contestation for state power” and was 
integrally tied to colonial “identity politics” (i.e., the Hamitic Hypothesis, a two-
tiered education system, etc.).177 
 
In order to construct a general account of the pre-genocidal identity narrative 
present in the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in 
Rwanda, this study was framed by two questions: (1) did the Church, as an 
institution, offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of 
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racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if 
any, did the Church, as an institution, play, in promoting a “social imagination” 
that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial 
ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-
state of Rwanda, that fostered genocide ideology? 
 
Research on the role of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 
1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, concentrated on Church missiology, with a 
focus on the messages promulgated, the attitudes held, and the actions taken by 
the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the 
Tutsi in Rwanda. 
 
5.2: The Messages Promulgated by the Church Prior to and During the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi 
 
R. Scott Appleby, in his book, The Ambivalence of the Sacred (2000), states: 
“[In] the modern West. . . the development and institutionalization of the ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ realms of life as separate cultural and social spaces” has occurred 
through the adoption of “a minimalist attitude toward religion’s possible role vis-
à-vis the state.”178 For Appleby, the “social location” of religion was shifted via 
the secularization of the nation-state during the Enlightenment period. Appleby 
posits that secularization “force[d] religion to redefine the nature, grounds, and 
scope of its authority. . . transfer[ing] religious loyalties to the nation, ‘the 
people.’”179 Katongole notes that the Church assumed colonial rule and the post-
independent nation-state of Rwanda to be “the primary social actor[s], with 
power to define, manage, and control the social realm.”180 Thus, the Church and 
its members were “externally driven” and detached from the “unique social 
location, institutional configuration, [and] cultural, power” that the Church 
should have had prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.181 
 
The question of the identity of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during 
the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, must begin with an analysis of the pre-
genocidal identity narrative promulgated by and present in the Church. In his 
book, Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda (2009), 
Emmanuel Katongole states that “identities get shaped by stories that so often 
remain hidden.”182 Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, 
Katongole states that the Church assumed that the racialized ethnic identities  of 
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were natural, not “formed identities” (authors 
emphasis).”183 Antoine Rutayisire, in his dissertation, Designing a Model of 
Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda 
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(2015), suggests that the Church “became a victim of self-serving leadership,” 
attaching itself to these formed identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, and thus 
engaging in colonial identity politics as a means of self-preservation.184 J.J. 
Carney, in his article, “Beyond Tribalism: The Hutu-Tutsi Question and Catholic 
Rhetoric in Colonial Rwanda” (2012a), writes: “Catholic missionaries helped 
propagate this Hamitic vision of Rwandan society during the first decades of the 
twentieth century” and that Léon-Paul Classe’s “patronage of young Tutsi elites 
in the late 1920s and 1930s reflected first and foremost his desire to protect and 
promote the institutional interests of the Catholic Church.”185 
 
Participants in this study offered evidence that Church-state relations were 
dichotomous contradictions of one another with the Church failing to live up to 
its prophetic mission and the state wrongfully exercising its power. To a person, 
ID 004, 006, and 002 described the “crisis of identity” in the Church, and argued 
that it should have acted as the “moral conscience of the state,” forming the 
“moral conscience of the people.” Instead they saw an “extreme synchronization 
of religion to politics.”186 Moreover, ID 006 noted: “The people in [the Church’s] 
authority should have condemned what was happening [prior to and during the 
1994 Genocide against the Tutsi].”187 Instead, as Longman and Ndorimana have 
argued that the Church committed “‘sins of omission’” because it failed to act as 
the conscience of the state being “malheureux les silencieux” (“unfortunately 
the silent ones,” my translation).188 
 
Furthermore, narratives offered by participants in this study suggest that the 
messages promulgated by the Church seldom lived up to the universal messages 
that the Church idealized prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the 
Tutsi. For example, all participants noted that the Church taught that the 
Christian life should be informed by Biblical values, but the reality, as ID 002 put 
it, was that the expectation was “to commit to the Church, not to a lifestyle. . . It 
was more a commitment to the Church than to Jesus, to God.”189 Similarly, all 
participants revealed that the identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were not 
regularly discussed and, if they were, the subject was taboo, despite three 
participants mentioning that the Church taught that the segregation and division 
of peoples ought to be avoided and that societal injustices ought to be 
addressed. These interviewee accounts support what,\ Carney, Gatwa, 
Longman, Katongole, Mamdani, Rutayisire, Safari, and van ‘t Spijiker have 
previously argued: that Classe’s – and more generally, the colonial Church’s – 
propagation of the Hamitic Hypothesis was deeply seeded in Cardinal Charles 
Martial Allemand-Lavigérie’s “top-down” pedagogy of evangelization” and that 
this was missiologically present in European colonial rule and the post-
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independent nation-state of Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi.190 
 
Did the Church’s messages in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi recognize that there was neither the Civilized nor the Dark 
Continent, neither Bantu nor Hamite, neither Hutu nor Tutsi, but that the Church 
should recognize and enjoy favor with all people, for all are one in Christ 
Jesus?191 
 
The participants interviewed for this study certainly did not tell that story. 
Indeed, all offered perspectives that affirmed that the “meta-narrative” of the 
Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi was dominated 
by a “poverty of [the social] imagination.” The narrative did little to transform 
the colonial and post-independent nation-state message, nor did it offer “a fresh 
lens through which to see ourselves, others, and the world. . . to shape a new 
identity within us by creating a new sense of we – a new community that defies 
our usual categories of anthropology” (authors emphasis).192 
 
Further, interviewees provided evidence that the messages of the Church, prior 
to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, recognized, promulgated, and 
lived within the constructed political identities of the Civilized versus the Dark 
Continent, the Bantus versus Hamites, and the Hutus versus the Tutsis, doing 
little to offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of the 
racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the 
present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Interviewee accounts also leant credibility 
to the view that the Church, as an institution, was not active in promoting a 
“social imagination,” but rather reinforced a political narrative dominated by 
secular European colonial ideology and the nationalistic fervor of the post-
independent nation-state of Rwanda. 
 
5.3: The Attitudes Held by the Church Prior to and During the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi 
 
In his apostolic exhortation, Gaudete et Exsultate (2018), Pope Francis states: 
“How can we fail to realize the need to stop this rat race and to recover the 
personal space needed to carry on a heartfelt dialogue with God?”193 In his 2015 
Lenten address, “‘Make Your Hearts Firm’ (James 5:8),” Pope Francis warns 
against a “globalization of indifference” in which a “selfish attitude of 
indifference has taken on global proportions” (my emphasis), stating: “In this 
body [the Church] there is no room for the indifference which so often seems to 
possess our hearts. For whoever is of Christ, belongs to one body, and in Him 
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we cannot be indifferent to one another. ‘If one part suffers, all the parts suffer 
with it; if one part is honored, all the parts share its joy’ (1 Corinthians 
12:26).”194 Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the attitude 
of the Church, as an institution, widely reflected an “attitude of indifference” 
(my emphasis).195  
 
When asked about who was influential in the early development of his faith life, 
ID 002 stated: “I don’t think anyone was influential. I was just born into the 
Catholic faith.”196 Later, ID 002 expanded on this thought stating: “I don’t think 
these people [the Church, as an institution] had the intentionality to influence 
one’s faith. They just go through the routines, so their students become this and 
that.”197 ID 002 also felt that his experience at Catholic primary school was 
comparable: “You took classes on religion, but they didn’t have any such thing 
as intentionality. You just had to pass the exam. There wasn’t such a thing as 
calling someone to a commitment. . . People just passed [on] information, there 
was no such thing as an intentional call to commitment.”198 ID 002 went on to 
note that: “Minor seminary was worse. You accumulated lots of knowledge about 
this and that. . . Lots of information. . . But really taking you through this calling 
to active faith was an area of weakness. It was [an] intentionality to commit to 
the Church, not to a lifestyle. And when it was a call to a lifestyle, it was a 
routine, saying prayers before bed, before meals. . . It was more a commitment 
to the Church than to Jesus, to God.”199 
 
ID 002’s sentiments largely reflect the view of participants, who were living in 
Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi (see “Appendix 
A,” questions A8-A17). Specifically, ID 002’s comments shed light on the 
attitude of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi. For many that I interviewed, the Church, as an institution, was 
characterized by a catechetical paradigm of routine and the accumulation of 
knowledge without reference to practical, lived application. This finding is 
consistent with what Antoine Rutayisire wrote in his dissertation, Designing a 
Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church 
of Rwanda (2015): “Those [scholars] who write from a spiritual, theological 
perspective point out the problems of churches that were planted on flawed 
missiological practices that led to conversions without real life 
transformation.”200 Rutayisire argues that “the kind of Christianity that was 
brought to the [African] continent. . . [did not] influence and change the social 
landscape of the continent,” but rather preached heaven “without transforming 
earth.”201 
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Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the participants I spoke with for 
this study told stories that suggested that Catholic missionaries failed to think 
outside of what Paul Gifford, in his article, “Recent Developments in African 
Christianity” (1995), calls, the “‘church growth’ school of California.”202 Gifford 
states: “The new missionaries to Africa are normally not working in 
development or schools or clinics; the vast majority are concerned with 
evangelization pure and simple.”203 Although colonial missionaries were often 
interwoven with development, Gifford’s statement reflects the focus that colonial 
missionaries had on the number of baptisms performed at the expense of 
Christianity’s influence on social ethics in society. Furthermore, this “attitude of 
indifference” (my emphasis), coupled with the ideology of the “‘church growth’ 
school of California,” detached Eucharistic celebrations from the Great 
Commission to “go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations. . . teaching them 
to observe all that I [Jesus] have commanded you [the Church]” (my emphasis), 
not just to not just to baptize “them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, 
and of the holy Spirit.”204  
 
During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, this “attitude of indifference” (my 
emphasis), elicited itself in the non-action of members of the clergy and the 
Church to openly speak out against the atrocities.205 Interviewees emphasized 
this point, especially when they criticized the Church for what it did not say or 
do. Congruent with what Van ‘t Spijiker writes, this attitude occurred because 
“the Roman Catholic Church. . . had before 1994 almost taken the position [as] 
the State Church. . . the official Church hierarchy tended to keep close to the 
political leaders in power, and restricted themselves. . . compromise[ing] the 
Church by relating itself too closely to the government.”206 
 
The attitude of the Church, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the 
Tutsi, was thus confined to colonial rule and the pre-genocide nation-state 
state, positing itself within the “political ideology at any cost.”207 As Katongole 
notes: “Those who accept Rome’s money, usually end up playing by Rome’s 
rules.”208 Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the Church 
was indifferent to the missiology of the state. As ID 002 and 004 respectively 
stated: “[There was no search for heart,” no one attitude to ask, “Who am I?”209 
As ID 004 put it bluntly, the Church “didn’t have courage” to “testify to the 
Christian life.”210 
 
5.4: The Actions Taken by the Church Prior to and During the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi 
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Quoting Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Emmanuel Katongole, in his book, 
Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda (2009), 
states: “‘Everything has its time. This is the time for a pistol, not a Bible.’”211 
During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, many members of the clergy 
remained silent; however, some actively participated or were complicit with 
genocide ideology, and very few fought against it. 
 
When asked about how Catholic education taught him to view other who were 
politically “different” from him – the categorization of society into Hutus, Tutsis, 
and Twas – ID 002 stated: “I don’t even remember a time when someone made a 
sermon about that. It was never mentioned. Honestly, I don’t remember a time 
during my seminary years, during any of my schooling.”212 Similarly, ID 003 said 
that the constructed concepts such as Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were “never brought 
up. . . Conflict between Hutus and Tutsis was never discussed.”213 This finding 
is consistent with what Timothy Longman, in his article, “Church Politics and the 
Genocide in Rwanda” (2001), discovered: “While some local level Church 
officials were directly involved in preparing and carrying out the genocide in 
their communities, most critics have condemned the [Church] not for [its] 
actions but rather for [its] inaction” (author’s emphasis).214  
 
ID 003 recalled three instances in which political and religious identities became 
contradictory and manifested in actions. First, she stated that the chairman of La 
Coalition pour la Défense de la République, “was her neighbor” and that during 
the sign of peace at Sunday mass, “he wouldn’t speak to anyone,” nor would the 
two share the sign of peace, something uncommon within the Church.215 Second, 
ID 003 recollected that “a kind of a relativism in the Legion of Mary movement” 
had arisen in which administrative leaders “began to lead the movement towards 
internal conflict, where, for example. . . a woman. . . would organize a meeting 
and then another one afterwards in which the first offered vague and general 
messages and the second, in which only Hutus would meet” and discuss, in 
hatred, Tutsis.216 ID 003 described the situation in this way: “They [the Church] 
were directly involved in the political ideology” of the government of Rwanda.217 
Third, ID 003 spoke of a European priest whose parish was in the 1992 Zone 
Tampone. She stated that he “played between the two” ideologies (that of the 
RPA and that of the government of Rwanda), “embracing the dynamics and 
playing in a way in which he was accepted anywhere, but he didn’t help to 
address the [underlying] issues” of Hutu and Tutsi.218 
 
ID 003’s remarks offer insight into the compartmentalization that, Peterson 
Tumwebaze described among clergy, in his article, “Inside Nyakibanda 
Seminary: How the Church is Moving on” (2016). According to Tumwebaze, 
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Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka was notorious for “carrying a gun on his hip and 
colluding with the Hutu militia” during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in 
Rwanda.148 Chris McGreal writes, “[For Munyeshyaka], “‘There was no cross. It 
was just the gun.’”219 Furthermore, Tumwebaze notes that “like Munyeshyaka, 
Father Athanase Seromba ordered the bulldozing of his church with 2,000 Tutsi 
inside and had the [remaining] survivors shot.”220 Longman contends: “Because 
they [the Church] did not speak out against the anti-Tutsi violence [between 
1962 and 1993] and the growing propaganda being broadcast throughout the 
country, but on the contrary displayed their own anti-Tutsi prejudices, the 
Church leaders’ continued [to] call for support of the regime.”221 
 
The narratives offered by the participants in this support what has been 
previously discussed by scholars: the majority action taken by Church, prior to 
and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, was often “interpreted by the 
public as an endorsement of the anti-Tutsi message. . . [And] Rwandan 
Christians came to believe that organizing to defend against potential Tutsi 
treachery was consistent with well established Church practice.”222 Interview 
data from this study suggests strongly that the Church, as an institution, did little 
to promote a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over 
the dominant European colonial ideology and the nationalistic narrative of the 
post-independent nation-state of Rwanda. Inaction was the norm and a large 
minority also engaged in negative action(s). “Conrad said it best: ‘All [of] 
Europe [including the clergy] contributed to the making of Kurtz.’”223 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
6.1: Conclusion 
 
Sarita Cargas, in her review of Timothy Longman’s book, Christianity and 
Genocide in Rwanda, states: “One cannot paint all Christian behavior with a 
single brush. . . [It is] a complex reality.”224 Prior to and during the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi, some members of the Church’s clergy did speak out 
against the dominant colonial and pre-genocide nation-state ideology, but few, if 
any, questioned the underlying narrative that propagated these systems. Few, if 
any, asked: is the Church, as an institution, offering a convincing counter-
narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth 
century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? And, 
is the Church promoting a “social imagination” that values religious identity, or 
truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic 
narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda?  
 
Pope Francis, in his apostolic exhortation, Gaudete et Exsultate (2018), writes: 
“They may well [have] be[en] false prophets, who use[d] religion for their own 
purposes, to promote their own psychological or intellectual theories” (my 
emphasis).225 Here, Francis retorts “a doctrine without mystery” (author’s 
emphasis) stating: “Gnosticism gave way to another heresy, likewise present in 
our day. As time passed, many came to realize that it is not knowledge that 
betters us or makes us saints, but the kind of life we lead” (my emphasis), 
namely the reduction and constriction of the Gospel message to “certain rules, 
customs, or ways of acting.”226 Under European colonial rule and in the pre-
genocide nation-state of Rwanda this form of Gnosticism was acutely manifested 
in the missiological teaching of the Church – the messages promulgated, the 
attitudes held, and the actions taken by the Church, as an institution – as an 
educational philosophy rooted in spiritual knowledge, failing to teach the 
practical applications of a life of faith. Francis states: “The result [wa]s a self-
centered and elitist complacency, bereft of love.”227  
 
Based on what I learned from interviewees in this study, the Church, as an 
institution, did little to offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant 
ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism 
in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Moreover, their accounts suggest 
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the Church, as an institution, was not an active player in promoting a “social 
imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European 
colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent 
nation-state of Rwanda. For those I interviewed, the Church, as an institution, 
was complicit in fostering genocide ideology insofar as it promoted and failed to 
counter the situational narrative of colonial and post-independent Rwandan 
Christian identity. 
 
Unlike ID 001, a Catholic raised in the present-day nation-state of Uganda, the 
Church in Rwanda did not “put [people] in the position to be different from 
[those] who [do] not fear God. . . To ask how [their] action[s] [are] going to 
be judged by God?”228 Rather, the Church failed to ask, “Who am I?” and this lay 
at the root of becoming “weak in testifying for Jesus” in “giving a testimony to 
Rwandan society.”229 For those I interviewed for this study, the Church did not 
live in its prophetic mission to recognize that “there is neither Jew nor Greek, 
there is neither slave nor free person, there is not male and female,” for all are 
one in Christ Jesus.230
 
6.2: Recommendations for Further Research 
 
In his post-synodal apostolic exhortation, Ecclesia in Africa (1995), Pope John 
Paul II observed that “so much fratricidal hate inspired by political interests is 
tearing our peoples [the Church] apart,” but “the Church has the duty to affirm 
vigorously that these difficulties can be overcome.”228 In much the same spirit, 
Emmanuel Katongole, in his article, “Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan 
Genocide: A Catholic Reassessment of Christian ‘Social Responsibility’” (2005a), 
has observed: “Tribalism is connected with the issue of political imagination, the 
urgent Christian challenge in response to tribalism is one of political 
reimagination. . . to conceive itself as a ‘wild space’ within which alternative 
forms of social existence can be engendered.” 
 
As an exploratory study, this research raised important directions for future 
research. A first is scholars must take seriously the ways in which the Church is 
called to nurture the “social imagination” of those it serves. Victor Thasiah’s 
article, “Prophetic Pedagogy: Critically Engaging Public Officials in Rwanda” 
(2017), begins to formulate a practical means by which the Church can begin to 
cultivate the “‘wild space’” of “social imagination.” Among others, some of these 
practical means include further research on the “unique social location, 
institutional configuration, [and] cultural, power” of the Church, as an institution, 
in the twenty-first century needs to be undertaken and, I would argue, this is 
especially true in nation-states that have experienced conflict, such as Rwanda, 
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Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).232 Moreover, another 
promising area for future research involves how the Church, as an institution, 
can redefine its pedagogical paradigm for seminary education. Unfortunately, 
because of the limited nature of this study, I was unable to probe in any depth 
the pedagogical paradigm and content that informed Rwandan seminaries prior to 
and after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Moving forward, more research 
is needed in this are – and not only in seminaries in Rwanda. One particularly 
rich are for future inquiry may be to learn more about seminaries that are 
experimenting with new pedagogical paradigm, such as those that are  
integrating  the “classical disciplines” of philosophy and theology with the 
modern disciples of “anthropology, ethnology, history, and linguistics” to 
address more meaningfully “new issues [such as] AIDS, ecology, gender, etc.” If 
the Church is to combat the “complexity of problems” in the modern world, 
identifying and learning more about new pedagogical models and practices in 
seminaries – and exploring the impact they may be having on the “social 
imagination” of lay and ordained leaders and those they serve – this topic is 
worthy of additional sustained study.233 Last, further research on church-state 
interactions needs to be undertake if the Church is to conceive an alternative to 
its contemporary relationship with the state. The Church especially needs to ask 
itself: who are we as an institution that claims an identity as the people of God? 
What is our role in promoting a “social imagination” that values religious 
identity, or truths over the dominant socio-political climate of post-modernity? 
And, how can we live in the post-modern world without compromising the 
underlying Biblical narrative in which our mission is rooted? All of these 
questions demand thoughtful reflection, and hold rich potential to inspire the 
expansion of the Church’s social imagination into the very real and “wild spaces” 
of a world that desperately needs Christ’s prophetic vision and unconditional 
love.
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[18] Sent by Pope John Paul II in June of 1994, Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, 
then president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (1984 to 1998), in 
a meeting with members of the clergy at a Junior Seminary in Butare, posed the 
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APPENDIX A 
 
[A1] What is your name? 
 
[A2] Where were you born? In what year? 
 
[A3] What is your current occupation? 
 
[A4] Are you a Catholic? If so, how often do you attend Sunday mass? 
 
[A5] Are you married? If so, is your spouse Catholic? 
 
[A6] Do you have children? If so, how many? Do they attend Sunday mass? 
 
[A7] Are you a member of the clergy? If so, when were you ordained to the 
priesthood? What seminary did you attend?  
 
[A8] How were you introduced to the Catholic faith? By whom? 
 
[A9] How were you educated in the Catholic faith? By whom?  
 
[A10] Could you describe how the Catholic faith was taught to you? 
  
[A11] What key messages were repeatedly emphasized? 
 
[A12] What did these messages – and the way they were taught –  teach you 
about what it meant to be a “good” Catholic? 
 
[A13] What did these messages – and the way they were taught –  teach you 
about what – and who – you were to value as a Catholic?   
 
[A14] What did these messages – and the way they were taught –  teach you 
about how you were to act, as a Catholic, with others similar to – and different 
from – you such as Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas? 
 
[A15] What did these messages – and the way they were taught –  teach you 
about what you were to stand up for – and against – as a Catholic in your 
community and nation-state?  
 
[A16] If a member of the clergy, could you describe seminary education? What 
messages did the seminary promote prior to and during the 1994 Genocide 
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against the Tutsi in Rwanda? What attitudes were present at the seminary before 
or during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi? 
 
[A17] If a member of the clergy, what actions did priests or seminary educators 
take prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi? 
 
[A18] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you 
remember as key ideas or themes that priests preached about at mass? 
 
[A19] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, how would you 
describe the attitudes and actions priests promoted from the pulpit? Could you 
offer an example?  
 
[A20] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, how did what you 
heard at Sunday mass inform your daily life – at work, home, and in your 
community? 
 
[A21] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you 
remember about the role and influence of the Church? 
 
[A22] Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, do you recall 
priests speaking out against genocide ideology in Rwanda? If so, what did they 
say? 
 
[A23] If a member of the clergy, what do you remember as key ideas or themes 
that you preached about at mass prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi? 
How would you describe the attitudes and actions you promoted from the pulpit? 
Could you offer an example?  
 
[A24] If a member of the clergy, did you speak out against the 1994 Genocide 
against the Tutsi in Rwanda? If you did, what did you say? How, if at all, did your 
preaching affect your attitudes and actions? 
 
[A25] During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, could you describe 
the relationship between the Church and the government of Rwanda? What was 
the balance between religious and political identity among clergymen and 
churchgoers? 
 
[A26] Do you see any difference between the pre-genocide Church and the 
Church of today? If so, what are the two to three major changes you see? If not, 
what remains the same? 
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[A27] How did the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda affect your 
Catholic faith, especially your faith in the Catholic Church and its leaders? 
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